_The Dissociative Mind in Psychoanalysis: Understanding and Working With Trauma_ is an invaluable and cutting edge resource providing the current theory, practice, and research on trauma and dissociation within psychoanalysis. _Elizabeth Howell and Sheldon Itzkowitz _bring together experts in the field of dissociation and psychoanalysis, providing a comprehensive and forward-looking overview of the current thinking on trauma and dissociation. The volume contains articles on the history of concepts of trauma and dissociation, the linkage of complex trauma and dissociative problems (...) in living, different modalities of treatment and theoretical approaches based on a new understanding of this linkage, as well as reviews of important new research. Overarching all of these is a clear explanation of how pathological dissociation is caused by trauma, and how this affects psychological organization -- concepts which have often been largely misunderstood._ _This book will be essential reading for psychoanalysts, psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists, trauma therapists, and students. (shrink)

Recent efforts in a range of scientific fields have emphasised research and methods concerning individual differences and individualisation. This article brings together various scientific disciplines—ecology, evolution, and animal behaviour; medicine and psychiatry; public health and sport/exercise science; sociology; psychology; economics and management science—and presents their research on individualisation. We then clarify the concept of individualisation as it appears in the disciplinary casework by distinguishing three kinds of individualisation studied in and across these disciplines: Individualisation ONE as creating/changing individual differences (the (...) process that generates differences between individuals: intrapopulation or intraspecific variation/heterogeneity); Individualisation TWO as individualising applications (the tailoring or customising of something—information, treatment, a product or service, etc.—for an individual or specific group of individuals); and Individualisation THREE as social changes influencing autonomy, risk, and responsibilities (the process discussed under the rubric of sociological individualisation theory). Moreover, we analyse conceptual links between individualisation and individuality, and characterise different sorts of individuality that the disciplines study. This paper aims to promote interdisciplinary research concerning individualisation by establishing a common conceptual-theoretical basis, while leaving room for disciplinary differences. (shrink)

Essential skills and attitudes necessary for active citizenship need to be cultivated as early as prekindergarten. This exploratory study investigated if three and four-year olds could be actively engaged in social studies practices through inquiry learning in a school garden. Eleven children openly interacted and conducted personally-driven investigations on a daily basis in the school garden located on their playground over nine-months. Three interviews with children, teacher observation notes, and lesson plans were analyzed to discover whether NCSS preK-12 learning themes (...) (2010) for the social studies curriculum could be correlated with garden inquiries. Three prevalent NCSS themes surfaced from data analysis with Civic Ideals and Practices, People, Places, and Environments, and Time, Continuity, and Change being most prevalent. Results imply that working in a school garden through inquiry learning can foster the development of democratic competencies and thus, could be used to design C3 lessons for preschoolers in the garden. (shrink)

Using computer simulations, we investigate the time evolution of the (Boltzmann) entropy of a dense fluid not in local equilibrium. The macrovariables M describing the system are the (empirical) particle density f = {f(x,v)} and the total energy E. We find that S(ft,E) is a monotone increasing in time even when its kinetic part is decreasing. We argue that for isolated Hamiltonian systems monotonicity of S(Mt) = S(MXt) should hold generally for ‘‘typical’’ (the overwhelming majority of) initial microstates (phase points) (...) X0 belonging to the initial macrostate M0, satisfying MX0 = M0. This is a consequence of Liouville's theorem when Mt evolves according to an autonomous deterministic law. (shrink)

In a recent paper [1], O. F. de Alcantara Bonfim, J. Florencio, and F. C. S´ a Barreto claim to have found numerical evidence of chaos in the motion of a Bohmian quantum particle in a double square-well potential, for a wave function that is a superposition of five energy eigenstates. But according to the result proven here, chaos for this motion is impossible. We prove in fact that for a particle on the line in a superposition of n + (...) 1 energy eigenstates, the Bohm motion x(t) is always quasiperiodic, with (at most) n frequencies. This means that there is a function F (y1, . . . , yn) of period 2π in each of its variables and n frequencies ω1, . . . , ωn such that x(t) = F (ω1t, . . . , ωnt). The Bohm motion for a quantum particle of mass m with wave function ψ = ψ(x, t), a solution to Schrödinger’s equation, is defined by.. (shrink)

We consider a one-dimensional translation invariant point process of density one with uniformly bounded variance of the number NI of particles in any interval I. Despite this suppression of fluctuations we obtain a large deviation principle with rate function F(ρ) −L−1 log Prob(ρ) for observing a macroscopic density profile ρ(x), x ∈ [0, 1], corresponding to the coarse-grained and rescaled density of the points of the original process in an interval of length L in the limit L → ∞. F(ρ) (...) is not convex and is discontinuous at ρ ≡ 1, the typical profile. (shrink)

This book addresses the most important questions asked about higher education: What should its content be? What should we educate for, and why? What constitutes a meaningful liberal education, as distinct from mere training for a vocation? These and many other questions are addressed by Reuben Abel, M.H. Abrams, Robert L. Bartley, Ronald Berman, Also S. Bernardo, Wm. Theodore deBary, Gray Dorsey, Joseph Dunner, Nathan Glazer, Feliks Gross, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Gerald Holton, Sidney Hook, Charles Issawi, Montimer R. Kadish, Paul Oscar (...) Krissteller, paul Kurtz, Herbert I. London, Ernest Nagel, Henry R. Novotny, Frederick A. Olafson, Michael Rabin, Howard B. Radest, Joseph J. Schwab, Robert F. Sexton, Thomas Sowell, John B. Stephenson, and Miro M. Todorovich. (shrink)

Fred Dretske asserts that the conscious or phenomenal experiences associated with our perceptual states—e.g. the qualitative or subjective features involved in visual or auditory states—are identical to properties that things have according to our representations of them. This is Dretske's version of the currently popular representational theory of consciousness . After explicating the core of Dretske's representational thesis, I offer two criticisms. I suggest that Dretske's view fails to apply to a broad range of mental phenomena that have rather distinctive (...) subjective or qualitative features. I also suggest that Dretske's view, in identifying conscious experiences with features of our perceptual states, casts its aim too low. It deflates further than it should and, in consequence, fails to capture what are arguably some of the most important phenomena associated with our conscious lives. (shrink)

A set A is m-reducible to B if and only if there is a polynomial-time computable function f such that, for all x, x∈ A if and only if f ∈ B. Two sets are: 1-equivalent if and only if each is m-reducible to the other by one-one reductions; p-invertible equivalent if and only if each is m-reducible to the other by one-one, polynomial-time invertible reductions; and p-isomorphic if and only if there is an m-reduction from one set to the (...) other that is one-one, onto, and polynomial-time invertible. In this paper we show the following characterization. Theorem The following are equivalent: P = PSPACE. Every two 1-equivalent sets are p-isomorphic. Every two p-invertible equivalent sets are p-isomorphic. (shrink)

Most theories of learning consider inferring a function f from either observations about f or, questions about f. We consider a scenario whereby the learner observes f and asks queries to some set A. If I is a notion of learning then I[A] is the set of concept classes I-learnable by an inductive inference machine with oracle A. A and B are I-equivalent if I[A] = I[B]. The equivalence classes induced are the degrees of inferability. We prove several results about (...) when these degrees are trivial, and when the degrees are omniscient. (shrink)

Sheldon adds his voice to the growing chorus of protest against theological "fideism." Religion is not an irrational commitment to what cannot be known. Rather "pure straight reason, impartially pursued, leads by logical necessity to worship of... supernatural deity...." This rather surprising thesis is defended by identifying "true" philosophy, the wise pursuit of goods, with religion and morality, whose core is compassionate love, impartial and universal in scope.--P. F. J.

We show that a computable function $f:\mathbb R\rightarrow \mathbb R$ has Luzin’s property if and only if it reflects $\Pi ^1_1$ -randomness, if and only if it reflects $\Delta ^1_1$ -randomness, and if and only if it reflects ${\mathcal {O}}$ -Kurtz randomness, but reflecting Martin–Löf randomness or weak-2-randomness does not suffice. Here a function f is said to reflect a randomness notion R if whenever $f$ is R-random, then x is R-random as well. If additionally f is known to (...) have bounded variation, then we show f has Luzin’s if and only if it reflects weak-2-randomness, and if and only if it reflects $\emptyset '$ -Kurtz randomness. This links classical real analysis with algorithmic randomness. (shrink)

By focusing on Chinese cultural formations and critical discourses of the last decade of the century, the author dissects the intellectual, economic, and political contradictions of a turbulent era. This wide-ranging, deeply interdisciplinary work demarcates the cultural terrain by examining diverse media: film, television, avant-garde art, and literature, as well as critical theory and intellectual history.

Since 1991, sperm donors in the UK have had the legal right to withdraw consent for the use of their sperm in fertility treatment. This has the potential to adversely affect patients. It may mean that previous recipients of a donor’s sperm cannot have further children who are full biological siblings to an existing child, and that embryos created from the donor’s sperm and a patient’s eggs must be destroyed.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Living Alone:Solipsism in Heart of DarknessDavid Rudrum"... As if I could read the darkness."Philosophical Investigations, §635We live, as we dream—alone."1 This, Marlow's most eminently quotable aphorism, encapsulates a theme central to the outlook of modernism: what Virginia Woolf called "the loneliness which is the truth about things."2 This loneliness derives not from the absence of others—Marlow is surrounded by friends when he makes this assertion. It is a deeper (...) condition brought about by recognizing the limits of selfhood, by confronting or being confronted by them. This condition is central to Marlow's narrative predicament: he attempts to fathom the enigmatic self that is Kurtz, to understand "the tempestuous anguish of his soul" (HoD, p. 246); he is led, by this attempt, to question the nature of his own self; and, finally, he tries to relay the impenetrable essence of both these selves to the "other minds" of his narratees on the yawl Nellie. As we shall see, Marlow concedes defeat in all three of these struggles. Heart of Darkness, then, is a novel beset by the limits of subjectivity.It is also a novel which foregrounds the limits of language. Marlow concludes that we live in isolation from one another after musing on the failure of language to communicate adequately, to facilitate intersubjective understanding: "it is impossible to convey the life-sensation of any given epoch of one's existence" (HoD, p. 172), he says. [End Page 409] Conveying the meaning of his narrative to others is repeatedly written off as unattainable, and on numerous occasions Marlow, presumably wrestling with sheer wordlessness, falls silent.3 Indeed, Marlow's narrative is peppered with words highlighting the limits of language: words like "inconceivable" and "unspeakable," which F. R. Leavis famously dismissed as "overworked."Leavis described Conrad's "adjectival insistence upon inexpressible and incomprehensible mystery" as "worse than supererogatory," "tending to cheapen the tone" to a point "little short of disastrous." He concluded that Conrad was "intent on making a virtue out of not knowing what he means."4 That Leavis—a critic who fetishized "the concrete presentment of incident, setting and image" through the concrete use of words—should have failed to grasp and to value the novel's brush with wordlessness, is unsurprising (Leavis, p. 208). Nor is it surprising that two of the episodes in the novel that most clearly encounter the limits of language—Kurtz's last words and Marlow's lie about them—were written off by Leavis as examples of Conrad having a "bad patch" (Leavis, p. 208). Yet it is nevertheless instructive that a novel that insists on its linguistic and communicative limits should thus have been misread.This article reads these two issues of the limits of language and the limits of subjectivity together. To do so is to invoke a philosophical position in which language, selfhood and worldhood are interrelated, and their limits coterminous—a position found in the early thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein.ILike Marlow, Wittgenstein also sees the self as essentially isolated from other selves, and language as demarcating its limits. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the interconnected remarks "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" and "I am my world" delineate Wittgenstein's rethinking of the "egocentric predicament" in which, to paraphrase Marlow, we all live alone.5 This position entails a close relationship with solipsism: as Wittgenstein says, "what the solipsist means is quite correct" (TLP, 5.62)—which is not, of course, to suggest that solipsism itself is correct. The grammar of Marlow's assertion encapsulates this point. The card-carrying solipsist would assert "I live alone," but the loneliness that Marlow and Wittgenstein envisage is a [End Page 410] condition of our subjectivity that we all have in common, but cannot share. It is a transcendental solipsism.Nearly 300 years before Heart of Darkness was written, a poem by Robert Herrick anticipated some aspects of Marlow's assertion of transcendental solipsism:Dreames Here we are all, by day; By night w'are hurl'd By dreames, each one, into a sev'rall world.6This poem makes explicit something left implicit in Marlow's... (shrink)

If the contemporary rebirth of the ontological argument had its conception in Norman Malcolm's discovery of a second Anselmian argument it had its full-term delivery as a healthy philosophical progeny with Alvin Plantinga's sophisticated modal version presented in the tenth chapter of The Nature of Necessity. This latter argument has been the centre of a huge body of literature over the last fifteen years, and deservedly so. One is impressed that this version of Anselm's jewel is valid and sound if (...) any is. (shrink)